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I. INTRODUCTION

Public policy within the United States supports early, accurate, informed,
and conclusive legal designations of parenthood as of the time of birth. For
births to unwed mothers, genetic ties often help determine legal parentage.'
Where such births result from sexual intercourse between consenting adults,
genetic ties almost always themselves determine legal motherhood, 2 but often
only help determine legal fatherhood. 3

1A 1992 federal study, entitled "Supporting Our Children," said this:
Parentage determination does more than provide genealogical clues to a child's background; it establishes fundamental emotional, social, legal and economic ties between
parent and child. It is a prerequisite to securing financial support for the child and to
developing the heightened emotional support the child derives from enforceable
custody and visitation rights. Parentage determination also unlocks the door to
government provided dependent's benefits, inheritance, and an accurate medical
history for the child.

U.S. COMM'N ON INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT, SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN: A BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM 120 (U.S. Government Printing Office 1992). See also, e.g., Ragin v. Lee, 829 A.2d

93, 101 (Conn. App. 2003) ("We hold that a child who is the subject of a paternity action has a
fundamental interest in an accurate determination of paternity that is independent of the state's
interest in establishing paternity for the benefit of obtaining payment for the child's care and any
interest that the parents may have in the child."); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570 (2006) wherein the
Legislature found and declared:
(a) There is a compelling state interest in establishing paternity for all children.
Establishing paternity is the first step toward a child support award, which, in turn,
provides children with equal rights and access to benefits, including, but not limited
to, social security, health insurance, survivors' benefits, military benefits, and
inheritance rights. Knowledge of family medical history is often necessary for correct
medical diagnosis and treatment. Additionally, knowing one's father is important to a
child's development.
2 Thus, even where conduct during pregnancy (e.g., drug abuse) may be used to terminate
maternal rights shortly after birth, legal motherhood is usually first established by genetic ties
alone. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection .... They require
relationships more enduring. The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her
parental relationship is clear.") Any later involuntary termination of maternal rights usually
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While maternity and paternity laws are largely determined by state
lawmakers, states participating in certain federal welfare programs under the
Social Security Act must take account of federal paternity law guidelines.4
Since the mid- 1990s, participating states must require unwed mothers receiving
aid to cooperate "in good faith" in helping to establish legal paternity. 5 States
must also have child support plans providing "services relating to the
establishment of paternity" for children to whom financial assistance is
provided.6 Paternity establishments through voluntary acknowledgments are
contemplated. Such acknowledgments have only recently become a major
avenue for establishing legal paternity. They are now employed for all children
born to unwed mothers,7 as acknowledgment opportunities generally are made
requires significant proof. See, e.g., Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,747-48 (1982) (holding
that clear and convincing evidence of unfitness is needed before state may sever completely and
irrevocably parental rights in their natural children).
3In re Estate of Poole, 799 N.E.2d 250, 256, 259 (Ill. 2003) (stating that a parent and child
relationship does not arise under law for a man simply because no one disputes biological
parentage and that statutes often seek to insure that legal fathers "are parents in more than the
genetic sense").
4 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602(a)(2), 654(20)(A), 666(a)(5) (2000).
IId. § 654(29)(A). Herein, I employ the phrase "legal paternity" (as well as "legal
fatherhood," "genetic father in law," and "father in law") to encompass legal designations of
fatherhood as of the time of birth, whether or not such designations are made at birth or later
and whether or not they are founded on circumstances existing at the time of birth (e.g., genetic
ties or marriage) or thereafter (e.g., actual parenting). I assume here that only a man (whether or
not impotent) may be subject to a legal paternity designation. Incidentally, in most, but not all,
states, there can be legal paternity for only one man for every child born, though there need not
be any man ever assigned paternity under law (as when birth results from the rape by a genetic
father of an unmarried woman). But see Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 849-50 (La. 1989)
(recognizing "dual paternity" in Louisiana) compare Smith with In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 29
(Cal. 2004) (recognizing that there can be two competing paternity presumptions at birth,
though only one man is then deemed by a court to be a father under law).
6 42 U.S.C. § 654(4)(A).
7 For example, in 1994, thirty-nine states had no in-hospital voluntary paternity
acknowledgments. By 1997, only thirteen states had no such acknowledgments. U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families, Office of Child Support
Enforcement, Twenty-Third Annual Report to Congress, Table 39A, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cse/rpt/annrpt23/tables/TABLE39A.htm (last visited July 22, 2006). Today, of
course, all states participating in the federally-funded Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) program, within the Social Security Act, must provide opportunities for in-hospital
voluntary paternity acknowledgments for children involved in governmental assistance or child
support services, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii), and states typically extend these opportunities to
all unwed mothers. In the fall of 2005, the author surveyed state vital records offices; those
responding indicated there was no differing treatment of unwed mothers based upon their lack
of involvement with Social Security Act programs. Jeffrey Parness, State Vital Records Survey
(2005) (unpublished, on file with author).
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available to all unwed mothers whether or not there is state assistance. The
number of children born in the United States to unwed mothers has also grown
recently, making voluntary acknowledgment procedures even more important
to American paternity laws. "In 1950, a mere 4 percent of all children born in
the United States had unmarried mothers; in 1970, the percentage had risen to
slightly less than 11 percent; in 1980, it jumped to 18 percent. . . ."8 Today,
over one third of the children born in the United States are born to unwed
mothers, with the total number of children exceeding 1.4 million a year. 9 While
a voluntary acknowledgment is, by far, the most common way that the paternity
of a child born to an unwed mother is established, about one third of the
children born to unwed mothers in the United States have no designated legal
father at the time of birth.' 0
This Article begins by reviewing the federal mandates on both maternal
good faith cooperation and voluntary paternity acknowledgments. It illustrates
the nationwide confusion and uncertainties about these mandates. The Article
concludes with suggested reforms of both federal and state laws aimed at
securing more fathers in law at birth for children born out of wedlock in the
United States."

8 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN's RIGHTS 62

2005) (citing U.S. Census Bureau data).
9

(Harv. Univ. Press

Births to Unwed Women Set Record in '04, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 2005, 1, at 11 (report of
National Center for Health Statistics states there were over 1.4 million such births, accounting
for over thirty-five percent of all births in the United States). Teen mothers now account for
about a fourth of all unwed births, down from about a half in 1970. Id.
'0 In the fall of 2005, the author surveyed all state Vital Records offices. Responses
indicated that, in Alabama, fifty-five percent of children did not have a legal father, with thirtyone percent in Arizona, seventy-six percent in Delaware, forty-one percent in Florida, twentyeight percent in Idaho, thirty-four percent in Indiana, at least twenty-five percent in Maine,
thirty-seven percent in Michigan, forty-two percent in Mississippi, twenty-eight percent in New
Mexico, thirty-five percent in Pennsylvania, eleven percent in South Carolina, and about thirtyfive to forty percent in Washington. State Vital Records Survey, supra note 7. The results
suggest a need for future inquiry into the reasons for interstate differences. Results also indicate
that in certain communities within a state, far more children born to unwed mothers are
fatherless at birth than elsewhere in the state. For example, compare Kent and Sussex Counties
in Delaware with Newcastle County. Id. Future inquiry seems warranted here as well.
The author also surveyed, during the same period, all birthing facilities in Illinois. As with
the states, the responses on how many children born to unwed mothers have no acknowledged
father at birth varied between hospitals (from four to forty percent). Jeffrey Parness, Illinois
Hospital Survey (2005) (unpublished, on file with author).
" Early, accurate, informed, and conclusive legal paternity designations are crucial not
only to genetic fathers and non-genetic fathers who actually parent from birth, but also to
mothers, to their children, and to American government. See, e.g., James A. Gaudino Jr. et al.,
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II. FEDERAL MANDATES ON MATERNAL GOOD FAITH COOPERATION IN
NAMING GENETIC FATHERS

Federal statutes within the Social Security Act 2 demand that state
governments participating in certain federal assistance programs serving needy
children 3 have child support plans permitting "the establishment of the4
paternity of a child at any time before the child attains 18 years of age";'
providing "services relating to the establishment of paternity" for children for
whom assistance is provided;' 5 and, requiring mothers receiving assistance on
behalf of16their children to cooperate "in good faith" in establishing legal
paternity.

Governmental encouragement of women to divulge information about
potential fathers in law is not unusual, though it must be undertaken with care
No Fathers'Names:A Risk Factorfor Infant Mortality in the State of Georgia, USA, 48 Soc.
Sci. & MED. 253, 263 (1999) ("Missing father's [sic] names on birth certificates, a measure of
paternity, was a more important risk factor for infant mortality in Georgia than unmarried status.
This finding suggests that fathers, in some way, may influence infant health.").
12 See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-02 (2000) (state participation is voluntary).
14 Id. § 666 (5)(A)(I).
'" Id. §

654 (4)(A).

16Id. § 654 (29)(A). While there is no explicit federal statutory duty involving good faith

maternal cooperation in paternity establishment when federal Medicaid assistance is provided,
participating states are recognized as having "reimbursement" rights from third parties with
"legal liability." Id. § 1396a(a)(25)(B). At least some states extend the aforementioned Title
IV-D "maternal cooperation" duty to women whose children receive Medicaid assistance. See,
e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-6-113(6) (2005) ("The department [of public health and human
services] may adopt rules consistent with this part to govern eligibility for the Montana
medicaid program. Rules may include... cooperation with the state agency administering the
child support enforcement program under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 651,
et seq."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 17-56.55 (2006) ("In accordance with regulations adopted by
the commissioner, the department shall make the determination as to whether an individual who
has applied for or is receiving public assistance or assistance under the State Medicaid program
... or the Title IV-D program is cooperating in good faith in establishing the paternity of, or in
establishing, modifying or enforcing a support order for any child of the individual by providing
the name of the non-custodial parent and such information as may be required for this purpose.
The determination shall be made subject to good cause and other exemptions as specified by the
commissioner, by regulation."); 1 TEx. ADMiN. CODE § 354.2313(aX4) (2006) ("An applicant or
recipient of Medicaid benefits has a duty and responsibility to inform the Commission... of the
following: ... (4) the identity of the father of any child who is an applicant or recipient of
Medicaid benefits, and to cooperate with the Title IV-D Agency in establishing paternity and
medical support payments for the child .... ).
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as informational 7 and other18 privacy interests are frequently in play. For
example, unwed women who place their children for adoption often must
cooperate in naming the genetic fathers who have actually parented the children
so that opportunities for notice and a hearing can be provided prior to the
termination of any paternal rights preceding adoption.' 9 Women involved in
marriage dissolution proceedings usually must indicate whether they are pregnant. 20 In addition, continuing pregnancies often must be revealed for inheritance purposes when expectant genetic fathers (or other men with assumed
blood ties) pass away.2'

17 In order to pass constitutional muster, information on intimate or very personal matters
gathered by the government must be securely held and made available only for limited use by a
few. There are times when governmental authority may be used to obtain highly personal
information. See, e.g., Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
We balance the following factors to determine whether the governmental interest in
obtaining information outweighs the individual's privacy interest: (1) the type of
information requested, (2) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual
disclosure, (3) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, (4) the
degree of need for access, and (5) whether there is an express statutory mandate,
articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward
access. Id.at 551.
For statutory recognition, see, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1506 (2006) (inquiries
regarding sexual activity of recipient of public assistance are limited to those necessary to
resolve genuine disputes about parentage) and 42 U.S.C. § 654(26) (2000).
18 See, e.g., Coe v. Mathews, 426 F. Supp. 774 (D.D.C. 1976) (describing statutory "good
cause" exception to cooperation duty, which presumably includes matters such as potential
abuse and past rape).
19On the differing forms of cooperation required by states, see, e.g., Cecily L. Helms &

Phyllis C. Spence, Take Notice Unwed Fathers: An Unwed Mother's Right to Privacy in

Adoption Proceedings, 20 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 10-23 (2005) (arguing against mandatory
maternal
disclosure laws; finding there are alternative means of identifying putative fathers).
20
See, e.g., Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Local
Rules, 1.24 ("Pregnancy Disclosure").
21 See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-3 (2006) ("A posthumous child of a decedent shall
receive the same share of an estate as if the child had been born in the decedent's lifetime.").
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III. FEDERAL MANDATES ON VOLUNTARY PATERNITY
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A. Executing Voluntary PaternityAcknowledgments
Federal mandates on voluntary paternity acknowledgments came in 1996
under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.22
There, Congress replaced the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program, contained in Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, with a program of
block grants to the states for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF).2 3 Although state participation in the TANF program is voluntary, a
participating state must comply with the requirements of Title IV-D and its
accompanying regulations, including rules on voluntary paternity establishment.24
Within Title IV-D, Congress enacted guidelines to improve both paternity
establishment techniques and enforcement of child support orders. One key
section, as noted, requires genetic mothers receiving public aid to cooperate "in
good faith" in establishing legal paternity of the genetic father when
appropriate (as with unwed mothers who bear children as a result of consensual
sexual intercourse between adults as compared to unwed mothers who bear
children as a result of rape). 25 Another section concerns voluntary acknowledgments of paternity by putative fathers. 26 Congress enumerated various
methods by which a participating state must provide putative fathers with an
opportunity to execute a voluntary acknowledgment. 27 For example, one

22

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.

104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Comparable state
acknowledgment of paternity procedures predated this federal law. See, e.g., Anne Greenwood,
Comment, PredatoryPaternityEstablishment: A Critical Analysis of Paternity Process in
Texas, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 421, 428-32 (2004) (Texas approach).
23 Block Grants for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2112-13
(1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
24
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 654(20) (2000) (child support enforcement effectiveness); Id §
666(a)(2) ("expedited administrative and judicial procedures.., for establishing paternity").
The limits on federal funding programs conditioned on compliance with Congressional
mandates are reviewed in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
2' 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A).
2
6Id. § 666(a)(5)(C)-(E). These guidelines and their history are reviewed in Jayna Morse
Cacioppo, Note, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity:Should Biology Play a Role in
Determining Who Can Be a Legal Father?,38 IND. L. REv. 479, 486-88 (2005).
27 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (in a hospital or in a state agency office). Incidentally, such
acknowledgments may go by different names in state statutes. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-
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provision requires that states establish procedures for "a simple civil process for
voluntarily acknowledging paternity.,' 28 Another, more specific provision
demands that states have procedures for "a hospital-based program for the
voluntary acknowledgment of paternity focusing on the period immediately
before or after the birth of a child." 29 Yet another dictates that "the State
agency responsible for maintaining birth records [must] offer voluntary
paternity establishment services. 3 ° States must conform to these
general
3
federal requirements in order to participate in Title IV-D programs. '
A related federal law declares that states must develop procedures to
include the name of the father on the birth certificate of a child of unmarried
parents, but only if "the father and mother have signed a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity," or if "a court or an administrative agency of
competent jurisdiction has issued an adjudication ofpaternity. ' '32 Because most
birth certificates in the United States are dependent upon information gathered
by hospital personnel before or shortly after in-hospital births, in-hospital
voluntary acknowledgment procedures have been increasingly, and frequently,
employed recently to secure fathers under law for children born to unwed
mothers.33
B. Rescinding Voluntary PaternityAcknowledgments
In addition to the federal laws on executing voluntary paternity
acknowledgments, there are also federal laws on rescinding voluntary paternity
acknowledgments. One statute dictates that a participating state must consider
34
a signed, voluntary acknowledgment of paternity a legal finding of paternity.
This legal finding of paternity can be rescinded within the earlier of: (1) sixty
days of the signing; or (2) "the date of an administrative or judicial proceeding
relating to the child (including a proceeding to establish a support order) in
41 (West 2006) ("Certificate of Parentage") and § 26:8-28.1 ("Certificate of Parentage... shall
serve as the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity by a father.").
28 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i).
29 Id.§ 666(a)(5)(C)(ii).
30 Id.§ 666(a)(5)(C)(iii).
31See, e.g., id.
§§ 652(a)(7),

666(a)(5)(C)(iv) (both statutory-parents' social security
numbers-and regulatory-as established by the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services).
32 Id.§ 666(a)(5)(D)(i)(I)-(II).
33Voluntary acknowledgments are also occasionally used by genetic fathers of children
born to women married to other men, but only after the husbands and wives have denied the
husbands' paternity in formal papers. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4) (2006).
3442 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii).
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which the signatory is a party." 35 Thereafter, a signed voluntary acknowledgment of paternity can be challenged "only on the basis of fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the challenger., 36 Such
challenges are typically made by acknowledged unwed fathers who later allege
no genetic ties.37
Federal statutes have never provided meaning for the terms "fraud,"
"duress," or "material mistake of fact." Furthermore, neither the pertinent
regulations nor the legislative history of the Social Security Act offer much
insight. One federal regulation states that when there are allegations that "fraud
has been practiced" in a TANF program, the "definition of fraud... will be
determined in accordance with State law."38 Incidentally, in other federal
programs, similar terms have been specifically defined. For example, when the
Department of Housing and Urban Development seeks a recovery based on
fraud, it is defined, in part, as "a single act or pattern of actions ...[t]hat
constitutes false statement, omission, or concealment of a substantive fact,
made with intent to deceive or mislead." 39 And, when an individual represents
a client before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, fraud means
"conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent
'4 °
misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.
While federal lawmakers have remained silent on the meanings of fraud,
duress, and material mistake of fact in voluntary paternity acknowledgment
settings, the federal mandate surely has made some paternity disestablishments
more difficult since 1996. A Maine case illustrates an earlier, more sympathetic attitude. The case involved Jerome Blaisdell, who lived with Pamela
Flewelling beginning in 1991.41 Between 1993 and 1996 Jerome worked away
during the week, returning home to Pamela only on weekends.42 In 1994,

35Id. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)(I)-(II).
36 Id.§ 666(a)(5)(D)(iii). Implementation of these rescission standards, on occasion,

proves challenging. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41(b) (2006) (rescission within sixty days)
and § 26:8-30 (declaring, seemingly, that rescission may occur within sixty days only for fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact).
37It is unclear what differences arise for acknowledging fathers (with or without actual
genetic ties) seeking rescission where the acknowledging mothers lied about marital status so
that the challengers were unaware that there were presumed fathers prior to the acknowledgments.
3845 C.F.R. § 235.110 (2006).
3924 C.F.R. § 792.103.
40 37 C.F.R. § 11.1.
41Dep't. of Human Services v. Blaisdell (Blaisdell1), 816 A.2d 55, 55-56 (Me. 2002).
42 Dep't. of Human Services v. Blaisdell (BlaisdellI), 847 A.2d 404, 405 (Me. 2004).
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Pamela gave birth to a son, Ryan.4 3 A trial court found that at the time of birth,
44
Jerome "was aware of the possibility" that he was not Ryan's genetic father.
Nevertheless, in the fall of 1996, Jerome signed papers acknowledging
paternity. 45 Later that year, the Maine Department of Human Services
commenced a paternity proceeding. 46 In doing so, it advised Jerome he "could
undergo genetic testing., 4 7 Jerome declined and a trial court ordered him to
pay past and future child support.4 8 In June of 1999, the relationship between
Jerome and Pamela ended, a relationship that the Maine high court later said
Jerome "believed" to be "monogamous." 49 At the time of the breakup, Pamela
shocked Jerome by telling him "he was not Ryan's [genetic] father."5 ° As time
passed, Jerome heard "persistent rumors" 51 that finally prompted him to "obtain
DNA testing" in 2001.52 After testing demonstrated no genetic ties, Jerome
moved in March of 2001 to modify the 1996 judgment under
a civil procedure
53
relief."
justifying
"reason
a
for
remedy
a
rule allowing
The trial court granted the motion and the parties agreed that the trial court
"acted within its discretion in amending the 1996 judgment to indicate that
Blaisdell [was] not the child's father., 54 There was no mention of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact; of the true genetic father (and whether he
had ever stepped up to, or was forced into, parental responsibilities); of the
reasonableness of the timing of Jerome's suspicion; of any time lag in Jerome's
pursuit of testing once he had cause for suspicion; or, of Pamela's or Ryan's
stance regarding disestablishment. 55 Today, under TANF-driven mandates in

4'Blaisdell I, 816 A.2d at 55.
44
4 Blaisdell II, 847 A.2d at 404.
1Id.at 405.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48

Id.

Blaisdell 1, 816 A.2d at 56. The trial court's finding of Jerome's awareness of the
"possibility" of his genetic fatherhood went unnoted. Id.
49

soId.
S'Id.
52

Id.; Blaisdell 11, 847 A.2d at 405.
53Blaisdell I, 816 A.2d at 56; ME. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

' Blaisdell II, 847 A.2d at 405-06 (also finding that DHS has a "vested right to the
overdue payments," though Jerome would have no new support obligations).
55See id.
at 405-06. Pamela and Ryan--upon high court directive in Blaisdell I"participated" in the proceeding involving Jerome's request for modification of the 1996
judgment, but may not have been included within the "parties" who agreed the trial court acted
"within its discretion" in granting the request. Id.
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Maine,5 6 Jerome's road to paternity disestablishment likely would be far more
rocky, assuming his acknowledgment was guided by federal law."
IV. STATE LAWS ON MATERNAL GOOD FAITH COOPERATION IN NAMING
GENETIC FATHERS

Missouri regulations illustrate well the contours of a detailed maternal good
faith cooperation duty involving the identification ofgenetic fathers of children
who receive federally-subsidized, state-distributed governmental support.5 8
The state requires applicants/recipients to provide the Division of Child
Support Enforcement with certain "information pertaining to the noncustodial
parent (NCP) or alleged father (AF)" as well as to assist in establishing
paternity and child support orders.5 9 Information relating to NCPs and AFs
include men's names, ages, social security numbers, addresses, and
employment records; school, club, and union memberships; friends and relatives; physical traits; and vehicles and other property.60 Circumstances
excusing maternal cooperation include physical or emotional harm to a child or
a mother; domestic violence; incest or rape; or a pending adoption proceeding.6 ' Pleas regarding these "good cause" excuses
must be supported by
62
specific allegations and "corroborative evidence.

56 ME.

REV. STAT. ANN.tit. 19-A, § 1616(1) (2006). After sixty days, rescission requires

fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. Id.
57Not all court-labeled paternity acknowledgments may be subject to federal guidelines.
See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(I)(i)-(iii) (2000) The "simple civil process for voluntarily
acknowledging paternity" subject to federal limitations seemingly extends only to "hospitalbased" acknowledgments "immediately before or after" birth, and to "State agency ...
voluntary
paternity establishment services." Id. Thus, for example, acknowledgments during in-court
paternity proceedings may not be limited by federal rescission guidelines. See, e.g., F.B. v.
A.L.G., 821 A.2d 1157, 1159, 1163 (N.J. 2003) (man who "acknowledged under oath" that he
was the genetic father during a "typical paternity and support action" against him, also described
as having "signed... sworn Admission of Paternity," could seek disestablishment under the law
on relief from judgments, N.J. R. 4:50-1; no mention made of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41(b)
(West 2006) which deals with rescissions of voluntary acknowledgments on fraud, duress, or
mistake grounds, though fraud was relevant in a Rule 4:50-1 analysis). It is unclear where
Jerome Blaisdell signed the acknowledgment.
58 Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 13, § 30-8.010(1) (2006) (cooperation duty of
applicants/recipients receiving public assistance involving benefits from certain programs
funded under Title IV of the federal Social Security Act).
59
Id.§ 30-8.010(2).
60 Id. § 30-8.010(2)(A).
6 Id. § 30-8.010(3)(C)(1-5).
62 Id. § 30-8.010(3)(C).
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In Arizona, the maternal good faith cooperation duty is governed by far less
detailed written laws. A mother seeking cash assistance in Arizona must
cooperate by "[i]dentifying and locating the parent of a child for whom [cash
assistance] is requested." 63 She must also cooperate in "[e]stablishing the
paternity of a child born out-of-wedlock, for whom [cash assistance] is requested. 64 Cooperation includes completing "an affidavit of paternity" or voluntarily acknowledging
paternity with the father "in a signed, notarized
5
statement.'6
In many TANF participating states, there appear to be no easily-accessed
written laws on maternal good faith cooperation. This enables significant
intrastate variations flowing from the broad discretion allotted lower level state
officials.66
V. STATE LAWS ON EXECUTING AND RESCINDING VOLUNTARY PATERNITY
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A. Executions
As noted, under federal statutes, the states participating in the TANF
program must provide avenues for voluntary paternity acknowledgments in
both hospitals and agency offices. 67 To date, Congressional directives have not
been read to bar other state-created avenues for voluntary acknowledgments.
Thus, in various settings, men may prompt their own legal paternity by
admitting, claiming, or otherwise acknowledging genetic ties with children
born to unmarried women. Although its practices are not duplicated everywhere, the Illinois system illustrates the varying possible forms of voluntary
paternity acknowledgment.

63 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

§ 6-12-31 l(F)(I) (2005).

64Id.§ 6-12-311 (F)(2).
65 Id.§ 6-12-31 1(F)(2)(a)-(b).

66 In Illinois, paternity establishment liaison officers within the Department of Health and
Family Services have responsibilities that include educating and training hospital personnel
regarding in-hospital acknowledgments. According to Maggie Tuerk, one such officer (out of
eight or nine statewide), these officers do little about children born to unwed mothers not
involved with public aid who leave hospitals without designated legal fathers for their children.
See e-mail from Maggie Tuerk, Paternity Establishment Liaison, to Jeffrey A. Parness (Nov. 4,
2005) (on file with author).
67 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii)-(iii) (2000).
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1. In-Hospital Voluntary Acknowledgments
In Illinois, a parent-child relationship may be "established" voluntarily by
the "signing and witnessing" of a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity at a
hospital, in accordance with the Illinois Public Aid Code,68 when the parties are
applicants or recipients of public aid.69 If the mother of the child was not
married to the alleged father at either the time of conception or birth, the name
of the father is entered on the birth certificate only ifthe mother and the alleged
father have signed a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage. 70 In the event the
mother was married at the time of conception or birth, and the mother's
husband is not (or is not said to be) the genetic father, the alleged genetic father
may be entered on the birth certificate only if he and the mother sign a
voluntary acknowledgment of paternity after the mother and her husband (a
presumed father under law) sign a denial of the husband's paternity. 71 In either
setting, a voluntary acknowledgment means the signing "man is presumed to be
the natural father" 72 and usually "conclusively establishes a parent and child
relationship., 73 With an in-hospital voluntary acknowledgment, neither a judicial nor an administrative proceeding is required.74 Yet, notwithstanding its
"conclusive" status, a voluntary acknowledgment usually may be rescinded
within sixty days. 75 After sixty days, it may be challenged in court "on the
76
basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact.'
The in-hospital voluntary acknowledgment procedures used in other states
are comparable. There are differences between states, however, on such

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5-6(a) (2006) (Illinois Parentage Act of 1984) and 305 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/10-17.7 (2006) (Illinois Public Aid Code). At times the relevant statutes use the
phrase voluntary "acknowledgment of parentage," as in Sections 6(a) and 5(a)(4) of the Parentage Act. See id.
69 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-17.7, 45/5(a) (2006). The procedures also apply to "cases
involving ...persons who are given access to the child support enforcement services" under the
Public Aid Code. Id.at 5/10-17.7.
70 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4), (5)(a).
68

71id.
72 750

ILL. CoMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(3).

535/12 (5)(a); see also 750 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 45(b)(2)
(presumption is "conclusive"). But see id.at 45/5(b)(2) (when a minor signs a paternity
acknowledgment,
the presumption is conclusive six months after majority or emancipation).
74
73 410 ILL. CoMP. STAT.

See 750 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 45/6(c).
" Id. at 45/5(b).
76 Id. at 45/5(d).
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matters as whether the acknowledgments (1) must be notarized," (2) must be
filed with a court, 78 (3) must contain information as to any genetic testing, 79 and
(4) can be returned prior to birth8 0
2. In-Agency Voluntary Acknowledgments
Paternity may also be established in Illinois through a statutory form of
voluntary acknowledgment that prompts a paternity presumption, but does not
involve personnel at a hospital or other location where birth occurs. 8 ' Under
the Vital Records Act,8 2 a "local registrar or county clerk after the birth shall"
provide the opportunity for genetic parents unmarried to each other "to sign an
acknowledgment of parentage ' ' 3 on a form supplied by the Illinois Department
of Healthcare and Family Services (formerly the Department of Public Aid). 8
As with a voluntary acknowledgment in a hospital, there is a presumption that
the signing man is "the natural father." 85 The "signing and witnessing of the
acknowledgment of parentage ...conclusively establishes a parent and child
relationship. '86 An in-agency acknowledgment may only be rescinded in the
way that an in-hospital acknowledgment may be rescinded, meaning that a
showing of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact is required after sixty

77In Illinois, the statute is silent. See id.
at 45/6(c). Notarized statements are expressly
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-1106(1) (2006); MINN.
Minnesota.
required in such states as Idaho and
STAT. § 257.75(1)
78In Illinois,

(2006).
no judicial (or administrative) proceeding is required. 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT.
45/6(c); see also 13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-302(a) (2006) (paternity acknowledgment must
be "in79a record"). Compare ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-812(A) (2006) (filed with court).
InIllinois there is no such express requirement and the relevant form has no mention of
testing. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(5); Form HFS 3416B (R-7-05)/IL 478-2370 (Illinois
Healthcare and Family Services Department), availableat http://www.ilchildsupport.com/
assets/082905_3416b.pdf(last visited July 22, 2006). Compare with TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §
160.302(a)(4) (Vernon 2005) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45g-302(1)(e) (2005).
80
Compare HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 584-3.5 (2005) (immediately prior to or following the
child's birth); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45g-304(2) (2005) (after birth).
s1See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4)-(5) (placing responsibilities for registering a
live birth to an unmarried woman or to a married woman where her husband is not the
"biological father" at the time of birth on "the institution" where birth occurred and "after birth"
on the "local registrar or county clerk").
82 Id. at 535/1-535/29.
83 Id.at 535/12(5)(a)(i)-(ii) (the mother may be married to another man).
4id.
85 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(4).
g 410 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 535/12(5)(a).

(acknowledgment under Vital Records Act).

See also 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(4), (b)
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73

days.8 7 While in-hospital and in-agency acknowledgments are similar in many
respects, only the latter are technically deemed available to unmarried couples
not involved with public aid or state child support services.88 Yet, as a practical
matter, in-hospital paternity acknowledgment processes are made available for
all births to unmarried women in Illinois. 9
As with in-hospital acknowledgments, in-agency acknowledgments outside
of Illinois are often quite comparably executed. Yet, there are some differences. For instance, state officials rather than local officials may be
utilized,90 notarizations may be mandated, 9' and information on any genetic
testing may be required. 92
As with some locations in other states,93 in certain Illinois communities
there are many more in-hospital than in-agency paternity acknowledgments
executed for children born to unmarried mothers. 94

87

750 ILL. COMp. STAT. 45/5(b) (sixty-day limit); 410 ILL. COMp. STAT. 535/12(7) ("fraud,

duress, or material mistake of fact," with no time limit set out).
88 Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a) and 305 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/10-17.7 (in-hospital)
with 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(5) (in-agency).
89 In the fall of 2005 the author performed a letter survey of most birthing facilities in
Illinois. The responses unanimously confirmed that all unmarried mothers were similarly
treated. Illinois Hospital Survey, supra note 10.
90 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-120(c) (2006) ("Department of Health shall offer voluntary paternity establishment services in all of its offices").
91See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.3 1(A) (2006) (notarized); id. § 3705.091 (2006)
(acknowledgment
signed at and filed with local registrar office).
92
See, e.g., TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 160.302(a)(4) (Vernon 2005) (testing); id. § 160.305
(2005) (filing with bureau of vital statistics).
93 State Vital Records Suivey, supra note 7.
Forty-three percent of the counties established paternity at a rate of 1.5 to 1.99
establishments for every out-of-wedlock birth. Another 26 percent of counties
established paternity at a rate of 2 to 2.49 for every out-of-wedlock birth. Fourteen
percent of counties established paternity at a rate of over 5 for every out-of-wedlock
births [sic]. In two counties the paternity establishment rate was greater than 50.
Counties with very high paternity establishment rates had very low numbers of outof-wedlock births. In fact, all of the counties with fewer than 50 out-of-wedlock
births had paternity establishment rates greater than 5; none ofthe counties with more
than 50 out-of-wedlock births had paternity establishment rates this high. For the
counties with very few out-of-wedlock births, dividing the number of cases that
established paternity by the low number of out-of-wedlock births led to very high
paternity establishment rates.
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3. Common Law Voluntary Acknowledgments
Besides Vital Records and Public Aid acknowledgments in Illinois, at times
common law voluntary acknowledgments can also prompt legal paternity for
96
95
children born to unmarried women. For example, in Jackson v. Newsome,
an Illinois appellate court found in 2001 that Anthony Newsome had signed
papers acknowledging paternity. This finding led to an agreed court order
dated January 22, 1992, entered in a parentage case brought by Elma Jackson
on December 6, 1991.97 In seeking to disestablish his paternity of Alecia
Jackson, born December 17, 1989, Anthony sued Elma in February, 2000.98
The appeals court held that his acknowledgment was comparable to an
acknowledgment filed with a local registrar or county clerk under the Vital
Records Act9 9 and, thus, similarly prompted a presumption of natural fatherhood under the Parentage Act. l'° The court then said Anthony could seek to
undo the acknowledgment under the conditions set out in the Parentage Act
that allow a suit to declare the non-existence of a parent-child relationship with
DNA tests, since there had been an earlier "adjudication" of paternity as
required by the Act.' 0' DNA testing was performed on December 29, 1998.102
The statutory provision on a declaration of no parent-child relationship was
available to Anthony as long as he acted within two years of obtaining

ELAINE SORENSEN

ET AL., EXAMINING

CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS

IN CALIFORNIA:

THE

COLLECTIBILrrY STuDY Report 1-5, 6 (The Urban Institute 2003) (prepared for the California
Department of Child Support Services).
9 Illinois Hospital Survey, supra note 10.
95These forms are not limited to births resulting from consensual sex between adults. The
Illinois Supreme Court has recognized a common law paternity claim involving an unwed man's
actual consent to artificial insemination even though there was no compliance with the
guidelines within the Illinois Parentage Act on children conceived artificially by married
couples. In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144 (IIl. 2003).
96Jackson v. Newsome, 758 N.E.2d 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
97
Id. at 344.
98 Id. Before suing, Anthony sought post-judgment relief in Elma's parentage case in
December 1997 (as well as an order for "blood testing" in May 1997), but he lost in April 1998.
Id. at 344-45.
99 Id.at 348. The only differences involved "minute and ministerial technical requirements." Id.
1oo
Id. (citing the Parentage Act, 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. 45/7(b-5)) (2006).
101Id. (citing the Parentage Act, 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. 45/7(b-5)).
,02 Id. at 351.
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"knowledge of relevant facts." This two-year period could be tolled during any
time "the natural mother or the child refuses to submit" to DNA tests." °3
The Jackson precedent suggests that, in Illinois, other common law forms
of voluntary paternity acknowledgment are possible. It can be reasonably read
to recognize in-court acknowledgments during paternity establishment cases
involving unwed couples not involved with public aid, as well as during
marriage dissolution cases as long as the in-agency acknowledgment procedures of the Vital Records Act are substantially followed. The Jackson
ruling also suggests that in-hospital acknowledgments can be undertaken by
individuals not involved with public aid or state child support services, as long
as Public Aid Code procedures are substantially followed. °4 Finally, the
Jackson precedent may even allow other forms of non-statutory paternity
acknowledgments (outside of hospitals, agencies, and courts). For example,
acknowledgments in lawyers' offices might be legally binding at times, as long
as accompanied by fair procedures modeled on those in the Public Aid Code.
Outside of Illinois, common law voluntary acknowledgments are also
recognized when there are agreements or other circumstances relating to the
genetic ties between men and unmarried women who engaged, or may have
engaged, in consensual sexual intercourse leading to birth. Acknowledgments
are often not truly voluntary, informed, or knowing. They can arise in parentage cases like and unlike Newsome. For example, legal paternity for a man
can arise by default when he fails to appear in a parentage case. 0 5 It has been
reported that paternity was established by default in about seventy percent of

103750

ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(4). The court in Jackson found that Anthony had acted
within two years because his "knowledge of relevant events" only arose when he completed the
DNA tests, not when he first asked a court to order tests. Jackson v. Newsome, 758 N.E.2d 342,
351 (IlI. App. Ct. 2001). This decision rested, in part, on the proposition that Anthony could
not begin a disestablishment proceeding without DNA tests, id. at 351-52, a proposition now in
doubt under the ruling in In re Parentage of John M, 817 N.E.2d 500, 506 (providing a
different reading of 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. 45/11 (a)).
104 This occurs today according to the results of the author's fall 2005 survey of Illinois
birthing facilities. Illinois Hospital Survey, supranote 10.

los Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d) (pleading averments "are admitted when not denied" in
the responsive pleading) with CAL. R. OF CT. 5.122 (petitioner who applies for relief at the time
a default is entered "must" submit "proof... of the facts stated in the petition"). See also Cal.
Form FL-230, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/fillable/fl230.pdf (last visited
July 22, 2006) (declaration of paternity resulting from a default or uncontested judgment;
petitioner for default judgment "declares" under "penalty of perjury" that the information in the
petition or complaint to establish parental relationship is "true and correct").
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the parentage cases in California in 2000.106 Also, legal paternity can arise for
a man when there are pleading allegations and related admissions as to the
required genetic ties107 Pleadings are often not verified, but simply reflect an
attorney's belief that there is "evidentiary support" for the alleged genetic bond
between a man and a child.10 8
While the Jackson precedent suggests that, in Illinois, the standards for
executing in-hospital or in-agency acknowledgments substantially guide the
executions of voluntary acknowledgments in-court and elsewhere, the ruling
indicates that the Title IV-D standards on rescissions do not apply to nonhospital and non-agency acknowledgments when they are sought to be voided.
Anthony Newsome did not have to demonstrate fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact.' 9 As illustrated by the cases in the next section, while other
states also look to the federal standards to guide executions of in-court
acknowledgments, they too do not always use them to guide rescissions of these
acknowledgments.
D. Rescissions
The lack of articulated federal standards on fraud, duress, and material
mistake of fact has led to quite different state law standards on rescinding
voluntary paternity acknowledgments. 10 These standards often arise without

106Leonard Post, Low TurnoutforPaternity 'Amnesty', 27 NAT'L L.J. 39, June 6, 2005, at
4 (citing 2003 study by the Urban Institute). By comparison, New York's default rate was about
ten percent. Id. Concerns about the fairness of defaults in California led to an amnesty program
from 2005 to 2006 under which unwed non-genetic fathers could challenge default paternity
judgments long after the normal time for challenge had expired. Id.; see also State ex rel.
Sanders v. Sauer, 183 S.W.3d 238 (Mo. 2006) (earlier paternity default judgment can prompt
criminal prosecution for nonsupport of child where defendant was not entitled to DNA testing).
107 See, e.g., Main v. State Dep't of Family Serv., 99 P.3d 982, 984 (Wyo. 2004)
("Stipulated Order Waiving Informal Hearing and Order Waiving Genetic Testing"); Turner v.
Suggs, 653 N.W.2d 458 (Minn. App. 2002).
10' FED. R. Cwv. P. 1l(b)(3).
109 Comparable is Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488,497 (Mass. 2001) (motion for relief
from judgment standard).
11
0Differences between and within states also arise on occasion because the applicability of
the federally-prompted guidelines on rescissions, incorporated into state laws, is not recognized.
See, e.g., Gebler v. Gatti, 895 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2006) (employing fraud together with
"paternity by estoppel" doctrine rather than the statute on rescission, 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
5103(g) (2005)).
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much inquiry into the balance of federal and state governmental interests." '
Such interests include: the desirability of nationwide uniformity via the use of
federal law; federal constitutional equal protection limits; the traditional federal
governmental deference to state laws on family matters; and, the prominence of
the child's-best-interest test in state laws. The current diverse standards for
rescinding voluntary paternity acknowledgments based upon a lack of genetic
ties are troubling. At times, they seemingly preclude certain non-genetic
fathers from pursuing rebuttal even when other similarly situated non-genetic
fathers, as well as children, mothers, or state welfare agencies may pursue it.
Of course, any legal distinctions, as between genetic mothers and genetic
fathers, or between categories of non-genetic or genetic fathers, must be
reasonable and comport with federal and state constitutional safeguards. The
following cases illustrate the interstate differences on fraud, duress,
and
13
material mistake of fact, 1 2 as well as some of the resulting problems."
1. Illinois
In September of 2004, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v.
Smith. 1 4 The case involved Romel Smith, an unwed man who sought to rescind his October 11, 1997 in-hospital voluntary acknowledgment of paternity

11IStandards can be common law or statutory. See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Sanchez, 37
Cal. Rptr. 3d 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (reviewing how intermediate appellate court decision led
to differing standards adopted by the General Assembly).
112 There are other interstate differences on rescissions of federally-guided voluntary
paternity acknowledgments. For example, in some, but not all, states there are time limits on
presenting fraud, duress, or material mistake challenges to earlier acknowledgments. Compare,
e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 11 ("challenge within one year") and 13 DEL CODEREGs. §
8-302(a)(5) (Weil 2006) (within two years) with 750 ILL. Comp. STAT. 45/6(d) (no time limit
mentioned) andN.Y. Family Court Act § 516-a(b) (McKinney) (no time limit mentioned). See
also, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. 5103(g) (2005) (challenger must show "clear and convincing
evidence"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1138(b)(1) (2005) (where parent was under eighteen at time
of birth, rescission sought for a child who is more than a year old must include hearing
regarding child's best interest); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-1106 (2004) (rescission must be
notarized);
ALA. CODE § 26-17-22 (2005) (no notarization needed).
11
3Rescission petitions usually are presented in trial court proceedings, most often by nongenetic fathers seeking paternity disestablishment. These proceedings can begin as child
support claims presented against non-genetic fathers. Thus, in the next case discussed, Romel
Smith sought to rescind his voluntary acknowledgment of paternity dated October 11, 1997 in a
proceeding begun on December 3, 1997, by the State of Illinois for child support on behalf of
his alleged daughter, Kendra. People v. Smith, 818 N.E.2d 1204, 1205-06 (Ill. 2004).
114 818 N.E.2d 1204 (Il. 2004).
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of Kendra Smith, who was born two days earlier." 5 The rescission request was
based on an allegedly erroneous "representation" ofhis genetic ties made by the
unwed mother, Valerie Dawson.' 6 Romel attempted rescission after
undertaking DNA testing in 2002."17 Romel's request was opposed by the
state, which had secured a court order of child support against Romel on behalf
of the Department of Public Aid in 1998.' 18 Romel lost in his effort to rescind
because the high court determined that section 5(b) of the Illinois Parentage Act
made conclusive the presumption of natural fatherhood arising from Romel's
voluntary acknowledgment ofpaternity. 19 Under that provision, there could be
no easy rescission if the acknowledgment was not challenged before the earlier
of: (1) sixty days after the acknowledgment was signed or (2) the date of an
administrative or judicial proceeding involving the child in which the signatory
was a party.' 20 After that, section 6(d) of the Act only allows a challenge by a
presumed natural21father, like Romel, "on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact."'
The court did not rule on whether fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact
applied to Romel as these issues had not been properly raised. 22 It did say,

5

Id.at 1205. Romel signed the acknowledgment at the hospital; this acknowledgment
was on a two-sided legal form developed by the Illinois Department of Public Aid. Brief ofthe
Plaintiff-Appellee People of the State of Illinois at *4, People v. Smith, No. 97 F 329 (I11.
March 2, 2004), found at 2004 WL 3221803 [hereinafter Illinois Brief].

..Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1206. The form was also signed by Valerie, who therein claimed
that Romel was "the biological father of this child." Petition for Leave to Appeal from the
Appellate Court of Illinois at *6, People v. Smith, No. 2-03-0418 (111. Oct. 10, 2003), found at
2003 WL 24033201 [hereinafter Illinois Petition].
"' Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1206. Romel undertook testing because Kendra "did not share
any of his physical characteristics." Id.The testing evidently was done "without Valerie's
permission or knowledge" during a period when Romel had visitation. Illinois Petition, supra
note 116, at *7.
"' Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1206-07.
"9M.at 1213.
120750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(3)-(b) (2006). The same standard applies to a voluntary
acknowledgment of parentage. Id.at 45/5(a)(4)-(b) (an acknowledgment of parentage occurs
under the Vital Records Act, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12, while an acknowledgment of
paternity occurs under the Public Aid Code, 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-17.7, as well as
supplementary administrative agency rules). Parentage acknowledgments seemingly differ from
paternity acknowledgments as only the former are tied to birth certificate practices around the
time of birth. Id. at 535/12(4); id.at 5/10-17.7.
121750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(d) (the challenger has the burden of proof).
122Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1208 n. 1 (Romel did not amend his complaint); see also Illinois
Brief, supra note 115, at *9 (Romel "urged the court to consider whether his complaint
contained an allegation of fraud.").
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however, that any post-sixty-day attack on these grounds would be governed, in
part, by the Civil Procedure Code provision on relief from judgments.' 23 The
court also suggested that if the legal paternity of Romel had been established in
some other way, as through a marriage between Romel and Valerie, the sixtyday period would not have applied. 124 In fact, married men subject to legal
paternity through marital presumptions in Illinois now have well over sixty
days to seek disestablishment based on the lack of genetic ties.' 25 Thus, it
would have mattered if Romel had been married to Valerie and had sought
disestablishment as well as divorce upon learning of her infidelity. 2 6
2. Connecticut
In Rivera v. Gonzalez,127 in 2002, a Connecticut Superior Court addressed
a rescission request based on material mistake of fact and duress. At the time
of the birth of Jose Luis Gonzalez to Ervaris Rivera in August of 1989, there
was no designated paternity. 128 In April of 1991, Jose R. Gonzalez (Jose Sr.)
and Ervaris each signed a paternity acknowledgment under oath naming Jose

123

Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1210 (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401(a), which was amended at

the time 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(d) was added to account for Section 45/6(d) petitions). On
fraud in Section 5/2-1401 proceedings, see, e.g., Falcon v. Faulkner,567 N.E.2d 686, 694-95
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (need to distinguish between intrinsic fraud and extrinsic fraud); see also
Temple v. Archambo, 161 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. App. 2005) (using an extrinsic/intrinsic fraud
analysis when a former husband sought to disestablish paternity arising out of an eleven-yearold consent decree; court found no extrinsic fraud, though there was intrinsic fraud; former
husband lost).
124 Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1210 (mentioning marriage dissolution cases). Romel, in fact,
urged that he had more time under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b-5), Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1207,
because he had been "adjudicated" to be the father in a "judgment" since his voluntary
acknowledgment had, by statute, "the same effect as ajudgment." Id. at 1209-10. He lost on
that argument. Id.
125 Under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(3) (presumption with no adjudication) and
45/8(a)(4) (presumption with an adjudication), a presumed father has two years to seek
disestablishment
from the time he obtains "knowledge of relevant facts."
26
1 The statutory provision on declaring no parent-child relationship was also unavailable
to Romel Smith as his acknowledgment had not been accompanied by any "adjudication of
paternity." Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1207. But for Valerie Dawson's poverty and, thus, reliance on
public aid, Romel Smith likely would have acknowledged paternity only when sued for support;
like Anthony Newsome, see Jackson v. Newsome, 758 N.E.2d 342, 351 (111. App. Ct. 2001), he
then probably would have been able to disestablish paternity because he acted within two years
of learning
he was not Kendra's genetic father.
127 Rivera v. Gonzalez, No. FA910609209, 2002 WL 31255475 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 30,
2002).
128 See id. at *1.
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Sr. as the father. 29 These affirmations were then filed with the Superior Court
and a child support order followed upon the application by the State of
Connecticut. 30 Jose Sr. petitioned the same court in February of 2002 to open
13
the paternity judgment because "the true biological father ha[d] come forth."'
Because of the length of time between the acknowledgment and the challenge,
under statute, Jose Sr. needed to show fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,
which might have involved evidence of a lack of genetic ties. 32 The court
found Jose Sr. could not rescind, as no prerequisite element was proven.133 It
also noted that even with a proven element, countervailing factors such as
laches, estoppel,
or unclean hands might well have negated any possible
34
rescission.
35
On the issue of mistake, the court did not use a "bright line standard."'

Instead, it adopted a case-by-case approach, though commenting that the
Connecticut statute on voluntary paternity acknowledgments "is instructive in
determining what constitutes a 'mistake.',' 36 The court cautioned that the
statutory standards, including "evidence that [a person] is not the father," are
not conclusive, but are only factors that should be considered.' 37 The court
held that the signing of a paternity acknowledgment where both signatories
"intended the consequences of their act, namely that the defendant would be
established as the child's legal father," was not a mistake that could prompt a
rescission. 38 The court emphasized
the facts that the child bore Jose Sr.'s
"surname" and "given name."' 139

129 id

130 Id.

131Id. As early as April of 2001, Jose Sr. sought to open the paternity judgment, but his
earlier efforts failed on procedural grounds. Id.
112 Id. at *2. The statute, which spoke to acknowledgments occurring between 1981 and
1997, was applied to the in-court acknowledgment. Id. For acknowledgments prior to July 1,
1997, such proof was unnecessary if attempts to reopen paternity acknowledgments were made
within three years. Id. Since 1997, attempts must be made within sixty days. Id. (citing CoNN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-172(c) (2002)).
1' Id. at *3-*7.
34 Id. at *3, *8.
135 Id. at *5.
136 Id. at *6.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 id.
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On duress, the court applied "contracts" principles to determine that Jose
Sr. was under no duress.' 4° It held that to be under duress, "one must prove (1)
a wrongful act or threat, (2) that left the victim no reasonable alternative, and
(3) to which the victim in fact acceded, and that (4) the resulting transaction
was unfair to the victim.,, 141 Here, Jose Sr. was not "pressured."' 142 He willingly
participated, in his own words, "as an accommodation because 'nobody knew
who was the father of the child"' and perhaps because he wished to "'prevent
1 43
the child from being fatherless until the true biological father appeared."
44
The court did note that Ervaris did not oppose Jose Sr.'s motion.
On fraud, the court found that Jose Sr. "colluded" with Ervaris "to
perpetuate" an "untruth" and that there was no "alleged false representation" by
Ervaris. 45 In denying rescission, the trial court also considered Connecticut's
and Jose Luis's financial interests.' 46
147
Several years later, a Connecticut Superior Court, in Thompson v. Fulse,
ruled on a motion to reopen a December 4, 1989 Connecticut court judgment
that was based on a voluntary acknowledgment signed in Florida by Willie
Fulse on October 16, 1989,148 about seven months
after the birth of Rishawn
Fulse to Andrea Thompson in Connecticut. 49 As to fraud, the Connecticut
court held that a challenger must prove the following elements:
(1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue
and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the
other party to act upon it; and (4)
the other party did so act upon the false
50
representation to his detriment.1

140 Id.at *6-*7.
141Id.

142Id. at

*7.

143Id. at

*4.

144
Id. at *1.
141
Id. at *4-*5.
'46
Id.at *8.

147Thompson

2004).

v. Fulse, No. FA890605982S, 2004 WL 1832891 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 6,

141
Id.at * 1. Willie went to a Florida college for five years, presumably starting in the fall

of 1989. Id.
149Id. Rishawn was born in Hartford, Connecticut while his parents "were 17-year-old
high school students." Id.
ISO Id.at *2. The burden is heavy; it requires "clear and satisfactory evidence" which is
more than a preponderance. Id.
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Willie failed to show fraud because Andrea did not "intentionally" keep her
sexual liaisons with Trevor, her former boyfriend, from Willie. 5 ' While she
was pregnant, she had told Willie he was the father, but, around March of
52
1990, Willie learned from Andrea that he "was not Rishawn's father."'
Willie did not then seek rescission of his voluntary paternity acknowledgment
because he thought "the matter had been taken care of' by Andrea. 53 Willie
only realized that it had not been taken care of on April 21, 2003, when he was
served with papers to appear in a Connecticut child support proceeding,
seemingly prompted by Andrea's receipt of state assistance.'- 4 Before then,
Willie "had some minimal contact" with Rishawn but had never been asked by
Andrea for child support.'55
While Willie failed to prove fraud (though it seems established under
Rivera), the trial court said he might still obtain a rescission due to a material
mistake of fact. In this "unique" setting, the court found Willie's arguments
"slightly more persuasive, particularly from Rishawn's point of view" because
the child might be helped "from a medical history standpoint" if Trevor was
named the legal father. 156 The trial court retained jurisdiction and ordered
genetic testing of Andrea, Willie, and Rishawn.'51
3. Tennessee

In Tennessee, a man can rescind a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity
(as well as other legal paternity designations by consent) on the basis of
extrinsic or intrinsic fraud, as well as on the basis of duress or material mistake
of fact. 58 In Granderson v. Hicks, a mother, Lisa Stephens Hicks, and a
putative father, Larry C. Granderson, entered into "a voluntary consent order of
paternity" in 1986 in a paternity case involving Myisha Stephens, who was then
about four months old.' 59 In 1997, Larry sought to set aside related paternity
and child support orders or, in the alternative, to require blood tests, after Lisa

Id. at *3 (though Andrea "may have failed to disclose").
Id. at *1 (Willie could not be the genetic father as Rishawn had sickle cell anemia).

'5'
I52
153

Id.

154 see id.

' Id. at *1-2.

156

Id. at *5.
*6.

117Id.at
158

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 24-7-118(e) (Supp. 1998).

159
Granderson v. Hicks, No. 02A01-9801-JV-00007, 1998 WL 886559, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 17, 1998).
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sought an increase in child support.160 Larry so moved because Lisa had told a
third party that the third party was Myisha's father and had "openly held out to
others that the third party [was] Myisha's father.' 61 The trial court denied
Larry's request without an evidentiary hearing on the alleged "fraud.' 6 2
An appeals court reversed. 63 Initially, it noted that a Tennessee statute
allows a trial court hearing a "question of parentage" to order, when "equitable," testing "for purposes of establishing or disproving parentage."' 64 Yet, it
also said that this statute "must be construed along with" the statutory
provisions on undoing voluntary paternity acknowledgments,165 which may be
challenged for fraud, duress, or mistake within five years, 66 or beyond five
years where there is "fraud in the procurement of the acknowledgment by the
mother" and where "the requested relief will not affect the interest of the child,
the state, or any Title IV-D agency.' 67 The appeals court ultimately concluded
on the allegation of
that "an evidentiary hearing" should have been ordered
68
"fraud in the procurement of the Consent Order."'
In 2005, the Granderson ruling was applied in State ex rel. Taylor v.
Wilson. There, in December of 2003, Cedrick Cortez Wilson sought "to
rescind his voluntary legitimation of [his] child," Cortarius Tyrez Taylor, who

was born in

1999.169

He did not seek a similar remedy regarding Cedrick

Cortez Wilson, Jr., who was born in 1995. 7° Both boys were born to Brandi
Shantika Taylor and were determined to be Cedrick's sons under a juvenile
court order from February of 2002." 7 The paternity findings were based on
Cedrick's "voluntary legitimation" during the pendency of the Juvenile Court
case where child support was sought for the two boys."72 The rescission request

160 id.

161 Id.

162 id.

163

Id. at *4

164Id. at *2 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-112(a)(2) (2005)).

Id.at *4.
Id. at *3 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-118(e)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1998)).
167 Id.(quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-118(eX2)).
168Id.at *4.
169 State ex rel. Taylor v. Wilson, No. W2004-00275-COA-R3-JV, 2005 WL 517548, at *1
165

166

(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2005).
170 id.
171id
172Id. Had Cedrick, for example, voluntarily acknowledged paternity ofCedrick, Jr. at the

hospital shortly after birth, the civil procedure rule would have been much less relevant than the
Tennessee Code provision noted in Granderson that spoke directly to rescinding such an

BRANDEIS LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 45

to end Cedrick's child support obligations for Cortarius was prompted when
73
Brandi informed Cedrick "there was a possibility that he was not the father."'
In June of 2003, a trial court denied the petition to disestablish paternity,' 7
and it recognized custody of both boys in Cedrick, who then took the boys "to
his home in California.' 75 Cedrick later had testing of both boys performed,
176
which confirmed genetic ties only between himself and Cedrick, Jr.
Cortarius was returned to Brandi in July of 2003.177
Accordingly, in December of 2003, Cedrick filed "a Petition to Rescind
Voluntary Legitimation" of Cortarius as well as to modify related custody and
support orders. 7 8 On January 9, 2004, the rescission petition was dismissed by
the trial court. 79 On January 22, 2004, Brandi sought custody of Cortarius
180
based on DNA testing showing no genetic ties between him and Cedrick.
Cedrick appealed the dismissal, urging that a Tennessee civil procedure rule
allowed him to obtain relief from the February 2002 order.' 8' The rule allows
relief "within a reasonable time" when "it is no longer equitable that a
judgment should have prospective application.' 8 2
The appeals court reversed and granted Cedrick's rescission petition after
"'analyzing the burdens ... on all who ha[d] an interest,"' which it said
included Cedrick, Brandi, Cortarius, and the State of Tennessee. 83 Interestingly, when it ruled, Brandi and Cortarius were likely living in Mississippi, and
Cedrick and Cedrick, Jr. apparently were living in California. 1 8 The interest
analysis was undertaken against a backdrop of several Tennessee cases,
including Granderson, which the court said "strongly" established the state
policy "favoring the requiring of biological parents to bear responsibility for
their own children.' ' 85 Upon analysis, the appeals court ruled that "the trial
acknowledgment. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-118 (e)(l)-(2); Granderson v. Hicks, No. 02A019801-JV-00007, 1998 WL 886559, at *1(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1998).
171Taylor,2005 WL 517548, at *1.
174Id.
175
id.
176id.
177
Id.
178

id.
179 Id.
180
Id.

181Id.at *2 (citing TENN. R. Cir. P. 60.02).
82
Id.(citing TENN. R. Cv. P. 60.02).

193Id.at *4 (quoting White v. Armstrong, No. O1AO1-9712-JV-00735, 1999 WL 33085, at
*5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1999)).
1 Id. at *1 (suggestion in the legal briefs).
185 Id.at *4-*5 ("strongly" used twice).
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court abused its discretion in failing to grant relief to [Cedrick].' I 6 In doing
so, it revealed the "suggestion in the record" that the genetic father of Cortarius
was then "incarcerated in Oklahoma."'8 7 It also found it "unlikely" that the
existing relationships between Cortarius and the two Cedricks would be
severed as Cortarius still had a half-brother, Cedrick, Jr., who was fathered by
Cedrick, Sr.' 88 While referencing Granderson and its use of Title IV-D
voluntary paternity acknowledgment standards for in-court paternity
acknowledgments, the Taylor court also seemed to allow easier rescissions of
in-court concessions, given its18interest
analysis and the non-exclusiveness of the
9
federally-mandated standards.
4. New York
The New York voluntary paternity acknowledgment statute declares that
sixty days after signing, a father "may challenge the acknowledgment of
paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,
with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary acknowledgment."' 90 The statute further states that upon receiving such a challenge,
"the court shall order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination of
the child's paternity and shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate."' 191
In a 1999 case, Wilson v. Lumb, 192 a trial judge required "genetic marker
tests or DNA tests"' 193 on behalf of a man who had signed a voluntary acknowledgment shortly after birth, but who later "became suspicious of the child's
parentage."' 94 The challenge came during a proceeding in which the man was
sued for child support.' 95 While ruling that genetic testing should precede any
"hearing on fraud, duress or material mistake of fact,"' 96 the trial court noted
186

Id. at *5.

1 id.
188
87

id.

189 Id. at *3.
190 N.Y. Fum. CT. ACT § 516-a(b) (Gould 2006).
191Id.

192 696 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).

'9' Id. at 401.
194 Id. at 399. "[S]ometime later" suspicion arose when relatives told the man and/or his
mother that "he might not be the baby's father" and when the man found a letter addressed to
the mother about nine months before the baby's birth. Id.
195 Id.
19 6 Id. at 401. Contra Hammack v. Hammack, 737 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703 (N.Y. App. Div.

2002) (finding that a different New York statute, N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 418(a) (Gould 2006),
was applicable when a divorced man sought to undo paternity (2000) established during an
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the "lack of case precedent" on the statute "which may not be clearly
worded,"'' 97 as well as the absence of any express direction that the best
interests of the child be considered before testing is ordered.198 It also said that
while "blood test results" alone do not always "establish biological
parentage,"' 99 voluntary paternity acknowledgments may be "more easily set
aside" with such negative results than at least certain court orders of filiation,
especially those accompanied by "stricter, more comprehensive" waivers of
rights. 2° Seemingly, the New York court in Lumb was more sympathetic to
rescissions of out-of-court voluntary acknowledgments while the Tennessee
court in Taylor was more open to rescissions of in-court acknowledgments.
5. Oklahoma
In a case reminiscent of Romel Smith's Illinois case, an Oklahoma
appellate court ruled on a rescission plea by Billy J. Chisum who sought
disestablishment of a voluntary paternity acknowledgment that was signed on
the date of the child's birth, June 7, 1999, and used in a 2000 administrative
child support order. 20 ' The rescission request came in April of 2001 after
Chisum had private testing done that was prompted by the mother's statement
earlier marriage dissolution proceeding (1998) for children born (between 1984 and 1993)
during a marriage (1976); reading § 418(a) to require denial of requested testing when not in
children's best interests); Martin D. v. Lucille F., 800 N.Y.S.2d 902, 904-05 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
2005) (no testing in 2005 even where mom's lies may have prompted voluntary
acknowledgment in 1997 and agreed child support order in 1998, since man "was warned before
the child was born that he may not be the father"; collateral estoppel and equitable estoppel each
in play).
9 Wilson, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
198 Id. at 401 (opining that perhaps legislators thought "[a]ctive misrepresentation or
wrongdoing" by a mother is enough "justification" for a rescission). Contra Melissa B. v.
Robert W.R., 803 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
199
Id.at 400 (citing Clara C. v. William L., 692 N.Y.S.2d 569, 579 (N.Y. Fan. Ct. 1999)).
A more recent New York case (where notwithstanding the lack of genetic ties, a man may be a
legal father if a child's best interests are served) is Charlesv. Charles,745 N.Y.S.2d 572 (N.Y.
App. 2Div. 2002).
00 Id. at 401 (citing Ulster City Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Wilbert D., 546 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788
(N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1989)). Of course, there may not be such "stricter" waivers in filiation
proceedings if the cases are simply based on previous acknowledgments ofpaternity, as inMark
D. v. Marion M., 785 N.Y.S.2d 204,205-06 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (differing from the Wilson
case in that the acknowledged father seeking disestablishment proceeded on a motion for relief
from a filiation judgment that he himself pursued eight years earlier, arguing "newly discovered
evidence" of infertility under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(2) (McKinney 2006); denying the father's
motion without DNA or other testing ever being ordered).
201 Dep't of Human Serv. v. Chisum, 85 P.3d 860, 861 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004). The
administrative order was also "docketed" in a trial court in May 2000. Id.
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that "Chisum was not the father., 20 2 The appellate court found there was a
"material mistake of fact" even though Chisum could have insisted on genetic

testing before his acknowledgment. 20 3 It found no "neglect" by Chisum due to
his failure to act earlier regarding testing. °4 It reasoned that any testing at birth
would "likely... inject an element of hostility into ... oftentimes already
volatile emotional relationships," would be "expensive," and may prompt
unfortunate perceptions as a result of"an attack on the mother's veracity and an
attempt to shirk responsibility for the child., 20 5 The court rejected arguments
about the applicability of a child's best interest or an equitable estoppel
analysis.20 6
6. Louisiana
In Louisiana, the standards for rescinding voluntary paternity
acknowledgments are different in that they vary depending upon whether the
acknowledging man was married to the mother and whether TANF services
were in play. In October of 2000, a Louisiana appeals court ruled on an
attempt by Ray Faucheux to void a paternity acknowledgment due to "fraud
and duress. 20 7 The acknowledgment covered Carley, a daughter born to Amy
Faucheux before Ray and Amy had even met. 20 One relevant statute said that
an acknowledgment may be rescinded more than sixty days after the signing
only if it "was induced by fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, or [when]
the father is not the biological father." 2 °9 Another provided "for the acknowledgement of an illegitimate child by authentic act,, 210 while another said
"every claim, set up by illegitimate children, may be contested by those who
have any interest therein.",2 " Given these laws, the appeals court found "there
21 2
is no prescriptive period for filing an action to rescind an acknowledgment"
202

Id. at 861 n.1.

Id. at 862 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 70(B)(1)(a)(2) (West 2006)).
id.
205 Id. at 862 n.2. This is so "at least where there is evidence that the mother has made
203

204

positive
assertions to the putative father concerning his paternity." Id. at 862.
2
06 Id. at 862-63 (noting, however, that some precedents outside Oklahoma support such
approaches, including Monmouth City Div. ofSoc. Serv. v. R.K, 757 A.2d 319,324 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 2000)).
207 Faucheux v. Faucheux, 772 So. 2d 237, 238 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
208

Id.

209 Id. at 239 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

210Oid.
211

212

id

id

§ 9:392(7)(b) (2006)).
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and that an acknowledgment usually cannot be valid where the acknowledging
man is not the biological father.2t 3
The Faucheux court cited to a 1997 Louisiana Supreme Court decision,214
which opined that an acknowledgment of an illegitimate child, executed in
connection with a Title IV-D proceeding, 215 only creates a presumption of
biological parentage which can be overridden whenever genetic ties are
lacking, "absent some overriding concern of public policy. 216 The Rousseve
court recognized that when such an acknowledgment formed the basis of a
court judgment for child support, Louisiana law expressly allowed an attack on
the judgment if procured "by fraud or ill practice ... within a year of the

discovery of the fraud or ill practice. ', 21 7 By contrast, the Rousseve court also
noted that an action to disavow the paternity of a child by a man who was at
some time the husband of the mother "generally must be filed within 180 days
after the husband learned... of the birth of the child."2 18 Yet, where such a
husband "erroneously believed, because of misrepresentation, fraud, or deception by the mother, that he was the father of the child, then the time for
filing suit for disavowal of paternity shall be suspended during the period of
such erroneous belief or for ten years, whichever ends first. ' 2 19
Because unwed Matthew Rousseve had not yet proven his allegations "that
he had just become aware of fraud or misrepresentation by the child's
mother 220 when he sought paternity disavowal involving a court judgment, the
high court remanded the case "to the trial court for a hearing." 22 1 Clearly
though, because Matthew had never been married to the mother, he had more

2 3

1 1d "

214 id.

215 Rousseve v. Jones, 704 So. 2d 229, 230 (La. 1997).
216 Id.at 232-33 (not exploring any public policy exceptions).
217Id.at 233 (using LA. CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN. art. 2004 (2006)).
218
Id. at 231 n.4 (citing LA. CfV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2006)).
219

Id.(citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:305 (2006)). See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198

(an action to establish the paternity of a child presumed to be the child of another man shall be
instituted within a year of birth; or up to ten years after the birth of the child where "mother in
bad faith deceived" the genetic father); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:395.1 (2006) (time period does
"not apply to the Department of Social Services providing services in accordance with 42
U.S.C.22 0666").
Rousseve,704 So. 2d at 230.

221id.at 233.
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time to "sit on" his newfound discovery of non-paternity (one year) than a
married man would have had (180 days).22 2
7. New Jersey
A New Jersey Superior Court decision demonstrates that even where fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact is proven, rescission may still be denied.22 3
In Monmouth County Division of Social Services v. R.K.,224 a married woman
gave birth in July of 1989, with her paramour present and named on the birth
certificate and with her husband consenting to the paramour's name on the
birth certificate. 225 About a month before the birth, in June of 1989, the wife
and paramour had begun to live together.22 6 A divorce followed in December
of 1989.227
Less than a year after the birth, in March of 1990, a county social services
agency filed a complaint for support and paternity against both the paramour
and the husband.228 Then, the paramour signed an admission ofpaternity and a
consent order for child support; the claim against the husband was dismissed. 229 This case was closed in May of 1992, because child support arrears
were paid and the child was no longer receiving governmental aid.230 The
paramour and mother continued to live together, for the most part, between
1989 and 1994.23!
After the mother received public aid again (intermittently) from 1993 to
1995, the state again sought a child support order against the paramour in May

Today, other Louisiana statutes seemingly differentiate between certain voluntary
paternity acknowledgment rescissions. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:392(B) (2006) (in
addition to Civil Code requirements, paternity acknowledgments shall be in accordance with 42
U.S.C. § 652(aX7) (2000)); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:395.1 (time period generally applicable
does not cover Department of Social Services acting under 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2000)).
223 The Connecticut court in Rivera suggested this may happen. Rivera v. Gonzalez,
No.
FA 910609209, 2002 WL 31255475, at *3(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2002) (laches, estoppel,
or unclean hands).
224 757 A.2d 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
225
1 d. at 321.
222

226 Id.
227
228

Id.
Id.

229 id.
23 0

id.

231

id.
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of 1995.232 In June of that year, the paramour consented to a child support
order, leading to a judgment on behalf of the state and against him in 1997.33
In March of 1999, after the mother sought an order increasing child
support, the paramour sought increased child visitation.234 A consent order
followed in August of 1999, without the consent of the state social service
agency, wherein the mother and paramour agreed, inter alia, to genetic testing;
to joint legal custody; and, to distributions of certain child-related expenses. 235
Testing occurred in October of 1999 and excluded the paramour as the genetic
father.236 Nevertheless, the paramour continued his relationship with the child;
in fact, in December of 1999, he sought in court papers not only to continue
with joint legal custody and with the shared parenting arrangement, but also to
terminate his child support and to have the child participate as the paramour's
best man in the paramour's upcoming wedding, as well as accompany the
paramour on his honeymoon to Disney World.237
In March of 2000, genetic testing excluded the husband as the genetic
father and the mother admitted in a plenary hearing that she went on a drinking
in 1988 and "could not... account for her activities on [a particular]
binge late
2 3s
night.
In June of 2000, the trial court denied the paramour's request to end child
support.23 9 It found that "fraud, duress or a material mistake of fact" was
needed.2 ° It proceeded to find that the paramour had "arguably" shown
mistake---"that mistake being that he was the biological father." 24' Nevertheless, although it perhaps could have voided the original adjudication of
paternity based on mistake, it chose not to do so because the paramour had
accepted paternity knowing he might not be genetically tied. The genetic father
could not now be easily located, and it would not be in the child's best interests

232 id.
233
Id. at
234
23

321-22.

Id. at 322.

5Id.

236 id.
231 Id. at

322.
Id. at 322-23.
239 Id. at 332.
240 Id. at 324.
238

241

Id.
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to allow rescission. 242 Thus, the paramour was subject to equitable estoppe
and there was no disestablishment.

243

8. Summary of State Rescission Laws
There is significant diversity in the state courts on how fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact may be used by men to undo their Title IV-D guided
voluntary paternity acknowledgments. 244 Are there five years to act or ten years
to act, or is there no real time limit on action? Is there usually a material
245
mistake when a man is wrong about genetic ties, though there is no fraud?
Can laches, estoppel, unclean hands, or a child's best interests bar a man's
attempt at rescission even though fraud, duress, or mistake is shown? Should a
Title IV-D agency's interests be considered when determining whether a
genetic father can pursue rescission? The absence of federal guidelines invites
the lack of uniformity in the states.2 6
Beyond these variations in the state procedures available to non-genetic
fathers seeking to rescind earlier acknowledgments, there seems to be no doubt
as to whether these same procedures apply when others (including, but not
limited to, signing mothers) contest paternity acknowledgments. Under federal
statute "any signatory" has a right to rescind a voluntary paternity acknow242
243

Id. at 330.
id.

244 The state statutory provisions on rescinding voluntary paternity acknowledgments are

assembled and described in Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences:Part I. Who Pays When
PaternityIs Disestablished?, 37 FAM. L.Q. 69, app. B (2003).
245 Recall, for example, the dicta in Monmouth County in New Jersey regarding
mistake.
At times, the impact of Title IV-D guidelines on state laws go unnoted. See, e.g., OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3119.962 (West 2006); State ex rel.Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio
2006) (man with no genetic ties might be able to gain relief from earlier child support order
founded on a voluntary paternity acknowledgment as long as he did not know that he was not
the genetic father at the time he signed; no discussion of potential conflict between Ohio relief
from judgment
statute and federal guidelines).
246
In similar settings, interstate differences may flourish where absent federal guidelines do
not invite (and where, constitutionally, federal laws may be unable to harmonize). For example,
the marital presumption (assuming a husband is the genetic father) seems solely a matter for
state law, as an area reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (deferring to California marital
presumption laws); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) (family matter exception to
diversity statute). Consider, for example, whether fraud can later undo a voluntary adoption by
a lesbian or gay "life-time" partner when the genetic parent splits upon revealing (or
rediscovering) heterosexuality. Mariga v. Flint, 822 N.E.2d 620,624,629 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(no undoing where no proof as to fraud at the time of adoption).
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ledgment within a certain time, often sixty days.247 Thereafter, states participating in TANF "must have in effect laws" allowing a post-sixty day
"contest" of a signed voluntary acknowledgment of paternity where the
"challenger" must show "fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact" and where
"the legal responsibilities ... of any signatory" usually continue "during the
challenge., 248 Does federal law require fraud and the like only of signatories
who contest after sixty days, or must anyone who so challenges meet the
requirements? Federal statutes use different terms: "signatory" and "challenger."

If a child challenges (for example, in order to establish parentage in the
genetic father), it seems difficult for the child to have to meet a burden of proof
involving "fraud, duress or material mistake of fact" since it occurred, if at all,
to another. 249 But, if a mother has custody of the acknowledged child, she
might be able to challenge on the child's behalf when she
herself could not
250
challenge due to the absence of fraud, duress, or mistake.
Further, if a real unwed genetic father challenges (for example, to establish
his own parentage), would only fraud, duress, or mistake personal against him
be sufficient, or could he rely, for example, on fraud committed on the
acknowledging dad? Should the real genetic father be allowed to interfere long
after birth and when an intact family relationship involving the non-genetic
acknowledged father, the mother, and the child exists? If fraud and the like is
not required in a challenge by the real genetic father, applicable limits would
presumably arise under state laws, because federal law is silent. Thus, a wide
range of diverse approaches would likely develop regarding non-signatory
challenges to federally-guided executions of voluntary paternity acknowledgments.
Some written state laws do exist regarding challenges by non-signatories to
voluntary paternity acknowledgments guided by the Social Security Act; these
laws vary from state to state. In Arizona, "the mother, father or child, or a

247

42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(5)(D)(ii) (2000) (if earlier, any signatory may only rescind by the

date of an administrative or judicial proceeding relating to the child (i.e., parentage claim) if

"the signatory is a party").

248 Id. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (legal responsibilities, including child support, may be "suspended during the challenge.., for good cause shown").
249 Id.
250
See, e.g., In re Westchester County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Robert W.R., 803 N.Y.S.2d

672 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (county sued in paternity on behalf of mother (who had herself sued
three earlier times) and child; best interests hearing required even if fraud in voluntary paternity
acknowledgment shown).
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party" to a court proceeding involving legal parentage for the child "may
challenge.. after the sixty day period only on the basis of fraud, duress or
material mistake of fact.",25 1 In Virginia, fraud and the like are required of "the
person challenging" the "voluntary statement acknowledging paternity. '2 52 In
Wisconsin, "a determination of paternity" arising from a statement acknowledging paternity "may be voided at any time upon a motion or petition stating
facts that show fraud, duress or a mistake of fact., 253 In Delaware, after sixty
days, "a signatory of an acknowledgment of paternity... may commence a
proceeding to challenge.., on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of
fact. ' 25 4 In Michigan, revocation of a parentage acknowledgment may be
255
sought by the mother, the signing man, the child, or a prosecuting attorney.
Finally, in Utah, after sixty days, challenges2 56may only be brought by "a
signatory" or "a support-enforcement agency.
There are other differences in state laws on the rescinding, contesting,
and/or challenging of voluntary paternity acknowledgments whose executions
are, or may be, guided by the Social Security Act. For example, there are time
limits that differ from those applied in the prior noted cases. Even with fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact, challenges must be commenced within a
year in Massachusetts, 257 within two years in Delaware, 258 and within four years
in Texas. 5 In Utah, a challenge may be made "at any time" on the ground of
fraud or duress, but a four-year period operates for material mistake of fact.W
VI. REFORMING MATERNAL GOOD FAITH COOPERATION STANDARDS
Federal paternity law mandates should extend beyond the current maternal
good faith cooperation and voluntary paternity acknowledgment standards. 261
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-812(E) (2006).
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1913 (2006).
WIS. STAT. § 767.62(5)(a) (2006).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-308(a)(1) (2006).
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.101(1) (2006). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

251 ARIZ.
252
253
254
211

§ 3111.28

(West 2006) (presumed father who did not sign, either signer, or a guardian or legal custodian
of the child may seek rescission).
256 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45g-306(1) to 78-45g-307(l) (2006).
257 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 11(a) (2006).
258 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-308(a)(2) (2006).
259 TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 160.308(a) (Vernon 2005) (unless signer was a minor). See
also id. § 160.609 (nonsigner has four years to seek rescission).
260 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45g-307(3)-(4) (2006).
261 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-70 (2000) (found within the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1305
(2000)).
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Federal statutes demand that participating states have child support plans
permitting "the establishment of the paternity of a child at any time before the
child attains 18 years of age;, 262 providing "services relating to the establishment of paternity" for children for whom assistance is provided; 263 and
requiring mothers receiving aid to cooperate "in good faith" in establishing
paternity. 264 Considering new federal norms to promote more maternal good
faith cooperation in naming fathers, as well as related efforts in securing more
fathers at birth for children born to unwed mothers, Congress should look to
three different time periods: pre-birth, at birth, and post-birth. In addition,
265
Congress should expressly encourage (as it may not be able to dictate)
explicit paternity designation guidelines that cover all children born to unwed
mothers in the United States, not just those involved with public assistance.266
Finally, to facilitate greater maternal cooperation and related efforts to secure
more informed and correct paternity designations at birth, Congress should
generally promote a greater public understanding of legal paternity consequences following births to unwed mothers.
In the pre-birth setting, Congress should do more to assure that known
expectant fathers be notified of impending births. 267 Then, Congress should
262 Id. §
26 3
2 64

265

666(a)(5)(A)(i); see also id.§ 654(20).

1 d.§ 654(4)(A).

Id.§ 654(29)(A).
While arguably Congress may not generally "regulate the domestic relations of society,"

under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it can act when liberty interests are
systematically maladministered or ineffectively enforced. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S.
689, 702 (1992) (citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582,602 (1859)); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 625 (2000). See also Jill Hasday, Federalismand the Family Reconstructed,45
UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998) (challenging the perception about exclusive local authority in
family matters).
266 These new mechanisms must fully respect maternal interests. See, e.g., G.P. v. State,
842 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Florida Adoption Act provisions on locating and
notifying natural fathers of possible adoptions stricken as unduly restrictive of natural mothers'
rights in choosing adoption and in maintaining privacy regarding intimate personal
information); see also Helms & Spence, supra note 19 (criticizing, on privacy grounds in
adoption settings, state laws promoting strongly or mandating that unwed birth mothers disclose
the identities of putative genetic fathers so that the men can be given notice).
267 There are some state law duties now owed by pregnant women to inform genetic fathers
of impending births, but they typically cover only married women. See, e.g., HAMILTON Co. R.
Civ. P. 1.24 (in an action for divorce, pleading shall set forth any "pregnancy and husband's
paternity status vis-A-vis the unborn child"); compareid. with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.12(4)
(2005) (in adoption arena: "The Legislature finds that an unmarried mother has a right of
privacy with regard to her pregnancy and adoption plan, and therefore has no legal obligation to
disclose the identity of an unmarried biological father prior to or during an adoption proceeding,
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promote expanding efforts to educate known expectant fathers about the legal
consequences of birth. State-administered programs, guided by federal laws,
could convey information to expectant parents on such matters as pre-birth and
post-birth parental responsibilities; paternity designation mechanisms,
including the consequences that flow from any failures to act affirmatively;
and, substantive state law guidelines on paternity, with explanations of important differences between certain settings, such as child support obligations and
participation rights in adoptions. In particular, more expectant parents should
learn that failure to secure, or loss of, paternity rights does not eliminate the
possibility of parental responsibilities, especially child support orders, long
after birth. Some states already require that pregnant women and certain family
members receive counseling as well as instruction on nutrition and the birthing
process during prenatal care. 268 Similarly, during the pre-birth period, states
could require that healthcare providers (or their designees) distribute
educational materials (including the addresses of relevant government agents or
agencies) to expectant unwed mothers and men identified as expectant
fathers.269 One state now prepares "pamphlets that discuss the benefit of establishing a parent and child relationship, the proper procedure for establishing a
parent and child relationship between a father and his child, and a toll-free
telephone number that interested persons may call for more information re270
garding the procedures for establishing a parent and child relationship.
Another state requires prenatal clinics to "offer prospective parents
the oppor27
tunity to sign a voluntary declaration of paternity" before birth. '
and has no obligation to volunteer information to the court with respect to the father."). Of
course, certain genetically-tied men, such as rapists, should be excluded.
268 See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 420-5-13-.05(2) (2005) ("patient and family" are
counseled
and instructed).
269
Of course, these materials must provide "objective and accurate" information. See, e.g.,
Letter from Governor Jim Doyle to Wisconsin State Senate (Jan. 6, 2006) (on file with author).
When vetoing Senate Bill 138, which would have required doctors providing abortion
counseling to pregnant women to tell the women about fetal pain, Governor Doyle found that
there was "no conclusive scientific evidence of when a fetus first feels pain" as there was on
fetal development and on the risks of abortion where information on the latter must already be
conveyed in order to secure "informed consent." Id.
270 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.32 (LexisNexis 2006). Unfortunately, there
is no
requirement that these pamphlets be widely distributed pre-birth. See id.
§ 3111.33 (pamphlets
and voluntary acknowledgment forms "shall" be made available to department of health,
hospitals, and individuals who request).
271CAL. FAM. CODE § 7571 (e) (West 2006); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.304(b)
(Vernon 2006) (paternity acknowledgment may be signed before birth); compare id. with
ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.165 (2006) (state registrar "shall" distribute voluntary paternity
acknowledgment forms "to each hospital ... to each physician.., whose practice includes
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In the at-birth setting, Congress should do more to encourage unwed
mothers 272 to fully complete, or help others to fully complete, 273 birth certificates so that their children have fathers designated under law near the time
of birth. When birth certificates lack designations of male parentage, state
governments should not be content with occasional searches of paternity
registers or similar governmental records when the need later arises.274 Congress should consider requiring that at the time of birth, unwed mothers and
certain others in attendance receive even more information on paternity-related
matters such as child support duties, paternity presumptions, and genetic testing
services.275 Where new mothers contemplate adoptions, additional information
should be supplied, particularly on the issues of paternity and child support.
In the post-birth setting, Congress should do more to encourage timely
amendments to incomplete or inaccurate birth certificates. Periodic governmental inquiries should be made of many unwed mothers who depart childbirth
facilities without any paternity designation. Similar inquiries may also be
appropriate where health care providers or others have reasonable concerns
about the accuracy of earlier paternity designations. Additionally, information
should also be made readily available after birth about genetic testing services,
alternative paternity designation procedures (such as in-agency acknowledgments and court proceedings), and government and private counseling services.
Already, there are state laws that require some new mothers to receive both
instructions on well-baby care
and referrals to sources of pediatric care during
276
visits.
care
health
follow-up

attendance at births, to each nurse-midwife... and to each other interested person... who
requests copies").
272 Unwed mothers whose pregnancies resulted from criminal sexual assault should be
treated differently. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.23 (2006) (notice and consent
provisions for unwed natural fathers in adoption proceedings are inapplicable where births
result from criminal sexual assaults).
273 Usually, natural mothers alone may not complete birth certificates. See, e.g., MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-15-221 (7)(b) (2005) (need "affidavit of paternity signed by the mother" as well
as signature of "the person to be named as the father").
274 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.14(4) (2005) ("diligent search.. . of the registry
of notices" for unwed natural father in adoption setting).
275 See also, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child
Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 325, 376 (2005)
(suggesting that genetic testing should be encouraged, but not required, at the time of birth
before acknowledgments are completed).
276 See, e.g., Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 19, § 30-30.90(5)(J) (2006).
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VII. REFORMING VOLUNTARY PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STANDARDS

Fundamental rights are usually involved in paternity establishment and
disestablishment proceedings.27 7 When such rights are sufficiently implicated,
then, under due process guarantees, any proceedings must promote only
compelling public interests with laws that are narrowly tailored and that utilize
the least restrictive means consistent with governmental goals.27 8 Additionally,
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection requires that governments treat
similarly-situated individuals equally. Unfortunately, many American laws on
voluntary paternity acknowledgments fail to measure up, either procedurally or
substantively,
and perhaps even infringe upon "the most basic" of civil
279
rights.

The noted cases reflect differing treatments of similarly-situated people
involved in voluntary paternity acknowledgments. Lessening inequality and
advancing uniformity are significant federal interests that should prompt
serious consideration of nationwide standards. 280 In their absence, proposed

277 See, e.g., In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d 466, 481 (111. 2005) ("[T]he interest of parents in the

care, custody, and control of their children .... perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests .... is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."). Paternity proceedings
may also involve the paternity opportunity interest a genetic father has in his child under Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), though the man has not yet become a parent under law with
the fundamental right to childrear. As this interest also has federal constitutional protection,
there are federal due process and equal protection safeguards, though they are less than the
safeguards afforded genetic fathers recognized as parents with fundamental rights under law.
See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (stating "some protection" under
the federal constitution might be required); Friehe v. Schaad, 545 N.W.2d 740, 748 (Neb. 1996)
(applying federal due process protection); In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 462 (Ga.
1987) (recognizing federal due process protection). Paternity opportunity interests are more
fully described in Jeffrey A. Parness, FederalizingBirth CertificateProcedures,42 BRANDEIS
L.J. 105, 109-17 (2003) (also comparing maternity and paternity laws).
278
In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d 466, 481 (111. 2005) (citing In re H.G., 737 N.E.2d 864,871-72
(Ill. 2001);
In re R.C., 745 N.E.2d 1233, 1241 (Il1. 2001).
279
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972). See also MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 123-24.
280 Federal law standards would also obviate troubling choice of state law issues where
relevant conduct occurred in several states. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Lichtenberg, No.
CA2002-11-125, 2003 WL 868306 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2003) (uncertain whether Indiana or
Ohio law applied to conduct of genetic father in an Ohio adoption case where child was born in
Indiana to Indiana parents, but where an Indiana adoption agency placed the child with a
prospective adoption couple in Ohio a few days after birth).

BRANDEIS LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 45

"uniform" standards available to state legislators would be helpful.28' Unifying
federal standards, of course, would mean that individual states could no longer
balance for themselves competing interests, such as: the need for more certainty
in initial paternity designations; the need to continue the traditionally strong
correlations between genetic ties and legal paternity, (especially since the
means of proving such ties have improved (and changed) dramatically in recent
years); and, the need to recognize legal paternity for men who have actually
parented children from birth. Even without preemptive federal standards or
uniform state law proposals, individual states should better balance the
competing interests when addressing fraud, duress, and material mistake of fact
in voluntary acknowledgment settings. In Illinois, for example, legislative or
common law initiatives should eliminate the uncertainties arising from cases
similar to Romel Smith's case.282
Beyond state law variations on fraud, duress, and material mistake of fact,
federal law prompts other significant interstate differences on undoing
voluntary paternity acknowledgments that further undercut comparable
treatment of paternity designations for children born to unwed mothers. For
example, provisions of the Social Security Act do not expressly address who
has standing to seek to undo acknowledgments after sixty days.283 Are only
281

The available forms of the Uniform Parentage Acts fail to provide sufficient guidance.

For example, the 1973 Act only recognizes that a voluntary paternity acknowledgment (which
initially need not be accompanied by the mother's consent) can prompt a presumption of natural
fatherhood that may be rebutted by "clear and convincing evidence" and may be overcome by a
man who also has presumed natural father status, as via a marriage, where "weightier
considerations of policy and logic controls." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(5)-(b) (1973). See
also id. at Prefatory Note ("All presumptions of paternity are rebuttable in appropriate
circumstances."). The 2000 Uniform Parentage Act simply states that "fraud, duress or material
mistake of fact," as employed by Congress in allowing post-sixty day rescissions of voluntary
paternity acknowledgments, are "ambiguous" terms "left to state courts to construe." UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 308, § 308 cmt. (2000). See also Am. Law Inst., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DIsSOLuTnoN: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03(d) (LexisNexis 2002) (legal
paternity (and its disestablishment by a married man) "is a matter outside the scope" of the
Principles).
282 Possible Illinois law reforms are discussed in Jeffrey A. Pamess, No Genetic Ties,
No
More Fathers: Volntary Acknowledgement Rescissionsand OtherPaternityDisestablishments
Under Illinois Law, J. MARSHALL L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) (suggesting that General
Assembly action is preferable and that legislators should also consider related standards on
repose (no rescission beyond a certain time); standing to rescind (i.e., who can sue to rescind or
to establish a parent-child relationship which would necessarily undo a voluntary paternity
acknowledgment); and when, if ever, a child's best interests might foreclose an undoing of a
voluntary paternity acknowledgment by a non-genetic father).
283 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (2000) (burden of proof on "challenger").
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alleged genetic fathers bound by the fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact
limits since the chief, if not sole, congressional intent was to secure more
paternal child. support, and not to secure continuing parental rights for
acknowledged genetic fathers with no genetic ties? Or, are acknowledging
mothers limited similarly because they too were signatories? If so, their own
deceit in acknowledging men at birth would seemingly bar maternal pursuit of
paternity disestablishment even where there are no genetic ties and where the
child's best interests may not be served.
Finally, federal statutes do not expressly indicate whether others directly or
indirectly seeking, as a practical matter, to undo voluntary paternity acknowledgments executed at birth for children born to unwed mothers are similarly
limited to fraud and the like. May the children themselves or may welfare
officials ever pursue such paternity disestablishments? If so, are either or both
required to demonstrate fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, either in
direct attacks, as where rescissions of acknowledgments are affirmatively
sought, or in indirect attacks, as where acknowledgments are effectively
superseded by later court orders in lawsuits to establish the existence or the
nonexistence of legal paternity (and where court orders can result in birth
certificate amendments negating earlier certifications and the voluntary
paternity acknowledgments underlying them)? Of course, such attacks would
be foreclosed if the federal statutory provisions were read to contain the
exclusive means for anyone seeking to disestablish, through any technique, a
legal paternity designation founded on a Title IV-D voluntary paternity
acknowledgment. As demonstrated earlier, state statutes to date have provided
differing answers.
If the foregoing issues are left to the participating individual states' laws,
284
variations nationally in paternity acknowledgment practices are inevitable.
Some states might be most concerned with removing child support responsibilities when requested by non-genetic fathers in order to "strongly" promote
the norm "favor[ing the] requiring [of] biological parents to bear responsibility
for their own children," 285 at least where marital presumptions are not in play.
Others might prioritize the need for the deterrence of maternal fraud, or for
upholding paternal consents by non-genetic fathers only when acknowledg284Interstate variations will not likely be plagued by many choice of law issues since most

births are not factually related to two or more states, as long as states choose to apply the
paternity acknowledgment standards of the state where the child is born. But see In reD.S., 840
N.E.2d 1216 (Ill. 2005) (exceptional case where place of birth may not be determinative).
285 State ex rel. Taylor v. Wilson, No. W2004-00275-COA-R3-JV, 2005 WL 517548, at
*4-*5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2005) ("strongly" used twice).
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ments were reasonably undertaken, focusing. on the unfairness in holding
deceived or clueless non-genetic fathers responsible for years of future child
support. Yet other states might focus on children's best interests, leaving the
undoing of paternity acknowledgments to case-by-case determinations. Some
states might even focus on the governmental interest in the avoidance of,or the
reimbursement for, financial aid for children with fathers whose mandated
support could relieve public fiscal pressures.
The following more particular observations on contemporary American
paternity acknowledgment and comparable admission of paternity standards
suggest areas for immediate inquiry and reform by state legislatures as well as
by Congress. Consider first the varying forms of statutory and common law
voluntary paternity concessions, including the voluntary acknowledgments
prompted and guided by the federal Social Security Act. 286 Unfortunately, not
all concessions are undertaken with the same assurances of voluntariness,
informed consent, and deterrence of fraud and the like. Yet, these assurances
seem important for all concessions of paternity. It should not matter whether
the mother receives public assistance. American federal and state governments
should be interested in designating early and accurately the legal paternity for
all children; they should not simply become truly interested when financial
reimbursement or reduced welfare payments come into play. Thus, a birth
certificate for a child born to an unwed mother should normally contain the
name of the genetic father, secured, in part, with both paternal and maternal
consent founded on the reasonable belief of blood ties. This would promote the
longstanding societal interest in early, accurate, informed, and conclusive
designations of legal paternity. Seemingly, more voluntary paternity acknowledgments for children born to unwed mothers would be promoted if, as in
California and Texas, pre-birth designations of paternity could be made. In
most instances, there is as much information about likely male genetic ties
before birth as there is at birth or shortly thereafter. Also, more acknowledgments would likely result if parental signatures could be secured at different
times and in different places. Why should an unwed expectant parent serving
in Iraq not be able to sign in Iraq while the other parent signs in the United
States? Are men abroad less likely to be fully informed or more likely to be

286 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (acknowledgments in hospitals, in birth record agency offices,

and other entities).
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deceived, or are women more likely to 28
deceive,
mislead, or be wrong about
7
away?
are
lovers
their
when
ties
genetic
Alternatively, a voluntary paternity registration by the unwed mother alone,
or by the unwed father alone, could be recognized and modeled on a Putative
Father Registry288 initiative by a man thinking that he is or will be the genetic
father of a child who could be placed for adoption. The registration would
represent the mother's or the alleged father's clear and unequivocal indication
of possible or likely genetic ties between the child or future child and the
named man. The man named by the woman would then be given notice so that,
where appropriate, he could act to formalize paternity as well as to engage in
actual parenting, or at least be made aware of potential child support
responsibilities. The woman would also be notified of the man's registration so
that she could be better informed of his wishes as she contemplates her own
childrearing, possible adoption, and the like.
It is important to trust unwed mothers who name genetic fathers who are
absent at birth. Of course, mothers must be made fully aware of the negative
consequences that might flow from any misrepresentation (as to the man and/or
her certitude of paternity). 289 There is usually less reason to trust men who
declare their genetic ties in the absence of testing and maternal cooperation,
since their access to relevant information is usually incomplete.
Single registrations of paternity will help prompt more genetic fathers of
children born to unwed mothers to become actual parents, whether or not they
are present at the birth and whether or not they wish to be recognized under law
at the time of birth.290 The fact that federal statutes require a voluntary
2

97

Of course, children could be born to American women while in Iraq when their lovers

are in the United States.
288 Exemplary guidelines are found in 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/12.1 (2005) (seemingly
limited to settings where there will or may be an adoption). Butsee J.S.A. v. M.H., 841 N.E.2d
983 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), rev. granted, 844 N.E.2d 966 (Ill. 2006) (suggesting failure to follow
guidelines bars paternity action); Form JV-505 (California Judicial Council), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/documents/jv505.pdf#search-'california%2statement/20
regarding/20paternity%20JV505' (last visited July 22, 2006) (statement regarding paternity
filed in juvenile court with jurisdiction to determine paternity).
289 These consequences should not be insignificant. See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies
and the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 871 (2005) (urging that laws should comparably
promote disclosures of material information during the negotiation of agreements between intimates as the laws promote disclosures when nonintimates (i.e., commercial entities) negotiate).
290 Of course, genetic fathers whose sexual assaults led to pregnancies or whose acts
of
domestic violence can be clearly anticipated are different. Such a maternal registration would
not likely automatically trigger fundamental childrearing rights for the man named, as he would
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paternity acknowledgment to be the equivalent of a judicial paternity determination, and thus require both maternal and paternal signatures, 29' does not
mean states cannot permit single registrations of possible paternity by mothers
or by alleged fathers. Single registrations, of course, would not constitute
conclusive findings; they would operate more like signatures in putative father
registries that are tied to possible adoption proceedings.
Further, it makes little sense to treat similar paternity concessions occurring
in distinct settings differently. 292 Significant comparability is insured if similar
acknowledgment or admission forms and accompanying procedures are utilized
in hospitals, in public agency offices, in courts, and perhaps even in lawyers'
offices when paternity concessions are made around the time of birth by unwed
mothers and alleged fathers so that children are, at the least, born with two
parents. The forms and procedures utilized in court cases certainly may need to
differ in some respects, as may the guidelines, but all paternity concessions
should be quite comparable in their pursuit of accurate and reasonable assents.
More uniform paternity concession procedures in different settings and
greater encouragement of early paternity identification should be followed by
more unified guidelines on rescission. Why should men whose children do not
receive public aid have longer to rescind similar forms of paternity acknowledgment or face different rescission guidelines than men whose children do
receive public aid? Why should men seeking to rescind similarly-executed
paternity concessions based upon fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact face
procedural and substantive standards differentiated by when or where the
concessions were given?
likely have to take some initiative under state law in order to move from simply a federal
parental (or paternity) opportunity interest to the fundamental federal and state childrearing
right. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Abortions of the ParentalPrerogativesof Unwed Natural
Fathers:DeterringLost Paternity,53 OKLA. L. REv. 345, 374-80 (2000).
29' 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)-(D) (2000).
292 Not all state-authorized, court-labeled paternity acknowledgments may be subject to
federal guidelines. The "simple civil process for voluntarily acknowledging paternity" subject
to federal limitations may extend only to "hospital-based" acknowledgments "immediately
before or after the birth," and to "[s]tate agency... voluntary paternity establishment services."
Id. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i)-(iii). Thus, for example, acknowledgments during in-court paternity
proceedings may not be limited by federal rescission guidelines. See, e.g., F.B. v. A.L.G., 821
A.2d 1157 (N.J. 2003) (man who "acknowledged under oath" that he was the genetic father
during a "typical paternity and support action" against him, id at 1159, also described as having
"signed... sworn Admission of Paternity," id. at 1163, could seek disestablishment under the
law on relief from judgments, N.J. R. 4:50-1; no mention is made of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:1741(b) (West 2006) on rescissions of voluntary acknowledgments on fraud, duress or mistake
grounds, through fraud was relevant in the Rule 4:50-1 analysis).
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In considering possible reforms of paternity concession standards, the
respective roles of Congress, state legislatures, federal and state courts, and
national and local administrative agencies must be explored. Common law
developments for certain issues may be wise, especially where slowly evolving
legal standards, in light of experience, are preferable to a one-statute (or onerule) fits all approach (as when future human conduct is largely unpredictable).
Localized experimentations with other issues (as with single parent registrations
beyond the Putative Father Registry) should also be considered. Yet for other
issues, exclusive statutory guidance by Congress will be prudent, as that will
promote a desirable uniformity of standards as well as a national debate, with a
resolution through national democratic processes reflecting countrywide public
opinion. Finally, for other issues, regulatory initiatives would be optimal, as
where technical expertise, practical experience, and the flexibility of administrative rulemaking is best suited to formulate reasoned solutions.
The time for dialogue on American paternity laws is now, because more
and more children are born fatherless in the United States. A comprehensive
and national discussion is in order, not continuing divergent local forays into
only bits or pieces of legal fatherhood at the time of birth.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Public policy (and at times, perhaps, due process and equal protection)
demands that American lawmakers, both federal and state, more vigorously
promote the early, accurate, informed, and conclusive designation of fathers in
law around the time children are born. There is, in particular, an urgent need to
develop legal standards that better promote more birth certificate designations
of paternity for children born to unwed mothers. Public policy also demands
that where paternity designations do not accurately reflect the requisite genetic
ties with children, paternity laws should be more fair and just in allowing
disestablishment.

